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Abstract 
Severe informational asymmetries, small size, unreliable financial statements and lack of 
collateral hamper the access of SMEs to traditional sources of debt financing. We use a 
survey data set of 4,583 SMEs from 25 European countries to analyse whether the use of 
leasing as a form of financing could fill the financing gap of constrained SMEs. We do so 
analysing whether the use of leasing by SMEs is triggered by the existence of financial 
constraints. Our findings indicate that after controlling for firm, bank and country-specific 
characteristics the likelihood of using leasing increases for financially constrained SMEs, 
which confirms our hypothesis. This paper contributes to the debate about differences in 
the use of lease financing between constrained and unconstrained SMEs, providing to the 
best of our knowledge, the first international evidence using a survey assessment of self-
declared financial constraints for SMEs. 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether leasing can act as alternative 
funding to complement the financing needs of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) whose access to traditional sources of financing is restricted. Conditioned by 
informational asymmetries and high screening and monitoring costs (Ang, 1992; 
Martínez-Sola, et al., 2018), financial literature perceives small and medium-sized 
enterprises as risky firms that end up having problems obtaining the financing they 
need (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). Policy makers 
around Europe have become increasingly concerned about the financial problems of 
SMEs because their success is necessary in order to sustain innovation, job creation, 
and economic growth (ECB, 2013). However, the financial situation of the European 
SMEs is likely to deteriorate along with the ongoing process of concentration of the 
European banking system (Han et al., 2017; Mol-Gómez-Vázquez et al., 2019). This 
process is likely to continue in the future because the ECB recognizes that it will bring 
benefits at the sector level (Praet, 2016; Constâncio, 2017). 
Leasing is a form of asset-based lending where the lessor (lender) is the owner 
of the leased asset and gives the lessee (borrower) the right to use it in return for 
specified payments during a specified period. Under lease financing, the lessor does 
not provide direct capital to the lessee and keeps ownership of the leased asset, which 
*The authors acknowledge financial support by Santander Financial Institute and Fundación UCEIF. 
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facilitates its repossession in the event of bankruptcy of the lessee. This reduces the 
risk born by the lessor and places the lending decision on the value of the asset rather 
than the creditworthiness of the lessee. These characteristics seem to suggest that 
leasing could overcome some of the disadvantages of traditional lending for SMEs. 
The European leasing industry continues to grow, with the portfolio of leased assets 
reaching 755.3 billion Euros in 2015 after an annual growth of 3.2%. In 2015, the firms 
represented through the members of Leaseurope granted total new leasing volumes 
worth 314.9 billion Euros, which represents an increase of 9.4% compared to 2014. As 
for the use of leasing by SMEs, Leaseurope estimates that 21.2% of their total 
investment has been financed via leasing in 2014, highlighting the great importance 
leasing has for European SMEs.1 We analyse the association between the use of leasing 
and the existence of financial constraints for an international sample of 4,583 SMEs 
from 25 European countries.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we add to the 
general debate about financing restrictions in SMEs showing how an alternative 
lending technology such as leasing can help to overcome their financing gap. More 
specifically, we contribute to the debate about differences in the use of lease financing 
between constrained and unconstrained SMEs, providing to the best of our knowledge, 
the first international evidence for SMEs. The only related evidence provided by Beck 
et al. (2008) combines small and large companies with a number of employees ranging 
from five to more than 500 and, therefore, fail to perform an analysis for SMEs. Our 
study improves their work by using a sample that, according to the EU 
recommendation 2003/361, only includes SMEs with less than 250 employees. Our 
analyses indicate that the SMEs that are subject to financial constraints, which are 
measured using five different variables, are 15.25% more likely to use lease financing. 
These results show a different picture than the one provided by Beck et al. (2008) 
where the existence of financing obstacles does not influence the use of leasing for 
firms with less than 500 employees. 
Secondly, we do intend to analyse what country-specific characteristics 
influence lease financing, while we also use the international dimension of our sample 
to control for country fixed effects in our analyses. This is important because there are 
differences in asymmetric information problems in SMEs across developed and 
developing countries (Mol-Gómez-Vázquez et al., 2019), which are likely to influence 
the association between lease financing and the existence of financial constraints. Our 
results indicate that country specific variables are important in determining the use of 
lease financing for SMEs across European countries. 
Finally, we also contribute to a better understanding of the leasing industry in 
Europe including the top 10 countries in terms of leasing penetration measured as a 
percentage of GDP (Gleeson, 2019). Europe accounts for 33.4% of total leasing world 
volume consolidating its position as the second largest market in the world whereas 
some European countries report the highest growth over the world such as Greece 
(65.32%), Lithuania (23.66%) or Hungary (18.35%). This data shows the importance 
of the European leasing market and calls for an analysis of European SMEs. 
 
1 Leaseurope, the European Federation of Leasing Company Associations, is integrated by 47 Member 
Associations from 34 European countries, representing around 93% of the European leasing market in 2015. 
Information available at: http://www.leaseurope.org/uploads/documents/LeaseuropeFF_15.pdf 
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We organise the paper with the following structure. In Section 2, we analyse 
existing literature and provide the hypothesis. Section 3 describes the sample and the 
methodology, followed by the results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents the 
summary and conclusions. 
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development 
SMEs are usually young firms, highly dependent on bank financing, with poor 
financial statements and short track records, which do not have enough collateral to 
pledge as guarantee to overcome asymmetric information problems (Levenson and 
Willard, 2000; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009; Berger et al., 2011). In addition, risk 
arising from weak legal and institutional environments might also have an influence 
on the financing decisions of SMEs (Hall et al., 2004; Jõeveer, 2013). For example, 
Hanedar et al. (2014) find that the likelihood of pledging collateral increases for SMEs 
operating in less developed countries due to the additional risk arising in such 
environments. As a consequence, SMEs end up having limited access to debt financing 
and experience severe credit constraints (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006; Beck et al., 
2006; Psillaki and Daskalakis, 2009). In this situation we suggest that leasing, a type 
of asset-based lending, could facilitate the access to debt financing to opaque firms 
(Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995; Lasfer and Levis, 1998; De la Torre et al., 2010). The 
lessor keeps the ownership of the leased asset, which in addition constitutes itself the 
sole collateral of the financing (Sultanov et al., 2009) and the main source of repayment 
in case of borrower bankruptcy. Therefore, the value of the leased asset is more 
important for the lessor than the overall risk of the lessee (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
The above characteristics imply clear advantages for SMEs. First, according to 
Kraemer-Eis and Lang (2012), leasing might also overcome the adverse selection 
problem because the leased asset might be too important for the lessor’s business 
operations to incur in default payments. Second, the misallocation of funds (moral 
hazard problem) under leasing is not possible because the lessor directly buys the asset 
and only allows the lessee to use it (Barger and Kuczynski, 1996; Gallardo, 1997). In 
addition, recent empirical evidence shows that leasing helps preserving the leased asset 
by ensuring its maintenance (Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002; Gilligan, 2004; Johnson and 
Waldman, 2010). 
Third, leasing, compared to other sources of debt financing, is less dependent 
on strong and efficient legal systems because the ownership of the underlying asset is 
not transmitted under lease financing, making repossession easier in the event of 
default or bankruptcy of the borrower (Berger and Udell, 2006). According to Sultanov 
et al. (2009), many jurisdictions show that the legal ownership of the lessor makes 
leasing less risky than other secured financing. Barclay and Smith (1995) and Sharpe 
and Nguyen (1995) argue that capital leasing has, compared with other forms of 
secured financing, the highest priority in the case of bankruptcy. In some cases, the 
lessor will receive the lease payments even if the lessee is in bankruptcy, placing the 
payments at the same level as other administrative costs. Moreover, as has been 
discussed above, under lease financing, there is no other collateral to recover, making 
the process easier and cheaper because firms do not have to go through long bankruptcy 
procedures. Typically, in the case of bank loans, a court has to execute the guarantees 
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associated to the loan, increasing repossession costs. In contrast, bankruptcy costs are 
lower in lease financing (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994). 
The higher debt capacity of leasing may be a particularly important reason to 
lease for SMEs, which are likely more financially constrained. According to Eisfeldt 
and Rampini (2009), there is a very strong relationship between lease financing and 
size, concluding that leased capital may be the most important source of external 
financing for small firms. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) argue that leasing is the first 
external financing option according to the Pecking Order Theory when informational 
asymmetries are important, such as in firms of reduced dimension. Empirical results 
in the existing literature do show a clear evidence about the association between lease 
financing and firm size (Beattie et al., 2000; Chavis et al., 2011; Cosci et al., 2013; 
Neuberger and Räthke-Döppner, 2013). However, existing studies fall to provide 
evidence on the use of lease financing in constrained SMEs. There are works that use 
samples that combine firms of all sizes, but without performing specific tests for SMEs, 
in Italy (Cosci et al., 2013), Germany (Neuberger and Räthke-Döppner, 2013), North 
America (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009, Lin et al., 2013), as well as with a cross country 
sample (Beck et al., 2008). We deal with this gap in the literature by testing the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: The use of leasing increases for SMEs which are financially 
constrained. 
3. Methodology: Data, Method and Variables 
This section describes the variables used in our empirical study. Table 1 
provides detailed definitions of all the variables, while Table 2 reports the correlations. 
3.1 Data and Method 
Our sample is based on the Flash Eurobarometer Survey on SME Access to 
Finance carried out by the European Central Bank and the European Commission 
between 2005 and 2006.2 From these datasets, we obtain the data regarding the use of 
lease financing and the remaining firm-specific variables for 4,583 SMEs in the EU 
25. 3,047 firms (66%) belong to the 15 old Member States of the European Union and 
the remaining 1,536 firms (34%) belong to the 10 newer Member States (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia are not represented because they joined the European Union after 
2006). After dropping 125 firms operating in the financial sector, we select 4,425 
observations which contain information about the use of leasing. Because of missing 
values in one or several of our explanatory variables, we arrive to a final sample for 
our regressions that ranges between 3,286 and 3,616. The period used in this paper is 
limited by data availability. Therefore, we cannot take into consideration a longer 
period or attempt to implement the analysis with more current data. However, our 
empirical contribution, previous to the financial crisis, will allow future contributions 
 
2 There are two years in the implementation of the survey because the information about the 15 Old Member 
States was collected in September 2005, while the information about the 10 New Member States was 
collected between April and May 2006. We recognize that the existence of two years in the definition of the 
survey can lead to confusion, and one might wonder whether survey data for the same firms are available 
for 2005 and 2006, or we are just dealing with a cross-section. However, we have to point out that each firm 
appears only one time in our sample, and therefore our data-set does not allow to form a panel or a repeated 
cross-section. Therefore, we estimate a cross-section. 
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to compare the impact of financial constraints on lease financing for SMEs across 
different economic and financial scenarios. 
Table 1 Variables, Descriptions, and Data Sources 
Variable name Description and source 
Dependent variable: 
Leasinga Variable that equals one when the firm uses leasing and zero otherwise. 
Country and industry dummies: 
Country dummiesa Twenty-five country dummies. 
Industry dummiesa Seven industry dummies, each one being equal to one if the firm operates in one of the seven sectors considered in the survey, and zero otherwise. 
Financial constraint variables: 
Assurea 
Variable that equals one when the firm states that difficult access to means 
of financing is the element that would hamper the development of the 
company and zero otherwise. 
Allowa Variable that equals one if the current financing situation of the company is not sufficient to see its projects through and zero otherwise. 
Accessa 
Variable that reflects the opinion of manager regarding the firm’s access to 
bank loan. This variable ranges from 1 (very easy access) to 4 (very difficult 
access).  
Concludea 
Variable that reflects the opinion of firms as to whether the projects cannot 
be successfully concluded without a loan from the bank. The variable 
ranges from 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (totally agree). 
Internallya 
Variable that takes into account whether the financial needs of the 
company are met internally or not. This variable ranges from 1 (yes, 
absolutely) to 4 (no, not at all). 
Debt worseninga Dummy variable that takes the value one if the firm has stated that its level of debt has deteriorated since last year and zero otherwise. 
Country-specific variables:  
GDP per capitab GDP per capita is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in current prices in U.S. dollars divided by the population in 2003.  
GDP growthb Ratio of GDP growth expressed in current prices in U.S. dollars in the period 2002-2003. 
Inflationc 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole in 2003. The 
GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP 
in constant local currency. 
Stock tradedc A measure of stock market development, calculated as the value of the stock traded as percentage of GDP in 2003. 
Credit infoe 
Credit info variable is computed as an index ranging from 0 to 6, that 
measures the scope, access and quality of credit information available 
through either public or private bureaus in 2003.  
Firm-specific variables: 
Size dummiesa 
Dummy variables micro, small and medium, each one being equal to one 
if the number of employees of the firm is less than 10 (micro), between 10 
and 49 (small), and between 50 and 249 (medium) respectively, and zero 
otherwise.  
Agea 
Categorical variable that ranges from 1 for those firms that have been in 
operation less than 2 years to 6 for those firms that have been in operation 
more than 30 years. 
Growtha Variable that equals one when the firm has increased the number of its employees since the last year and zero otherwise. 
Foreigna Variable that equals one when the ownership of the company is exclusively own by international companies and zero otherwise. 
Subsidesa Variable that equals one when the firm has already made use of public subsidies for its activities and zero otherwise. 
Source: 
a Survey on SMEs Access to Finance carried out by the European Commission between 2005 and 2006. 
b United Nations Statistics Division. 
c The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator). 
d The Financial Development and Structure dataset, the World Bank. 
e Doing Business Indicators 2005, the World Bank. 
f Heritage Foundation 
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Table 3 shows a summary of the statistics for the variables used in our 
regressions. The first thing we notice is the existence of variations in the level of 
financial constraints across firms. On average, three out of five of our financial 
constraint indicators show that firms in our sample present a moderate perception about 
the existence of credit constraints. The sample is made up of 55.11% of micro firms 
which is important since most empirical research in the financial literature neglects 
this group of firms due to the lack of data. The average firm in our sample has been in 
operation more than 10 years and more than 23% of the firms grew in the last year. We 
should also highlight that only 3.67% of the firms are foreign-owned and 18.37% have 
received public subsidies for its operations. Regarding country-specific characteristics, 
the statistics show that, on average, the countries in our sample grow at a high rate 
(23.17%). However, in spite of their economic growth, European countries in our 
sample still have considerable room for further improvements of their information, 
financial and economic structures. 
Table 3 Summary Statist 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N 
Leasing 0.5638 0.4960 0 1 4425 
Assure 0.1543 0.3613 0 1 4134 
Allow 0.2124 0.4091 0 1 4345 
Access 2.3769 0.8544 1 4 4041 
Conclude 2.4710 1.1748 1 4 4304 
Internally 1.7107 0.8006 1 4 4338 
Debt worsening 0.1540 0.3610 0 1 4085 
Age 4.1054 1.5438 1 6 4442 
Micro 0.5511 0.4974 0 1 4458 
Small 0.2891 0.4534 0 1 4458 
Medium 0.1597 0.3664 0 1 4458 
Growth 0.2332 0.4229 0 1 4442 
Subsides 0.1837 0.3873 0 1 4404 
Foreign 0.0367 0.1881 0 1 4412 
GDP per capita 9.8559 0.6950 8.4711 11.0871 4458 
GDP growth 0.2317 0.0575 0.0940 0.3600 4458 
Inflation 0.0260 0.0156 -0.0081 0.0565 4458 
Credit info 4.7047 1.1700 3 6 4169 
Stock traded 0.3243 0.3005 0.0099 0.9463 3930 
Notes: Definitions and sources of the variables are reported in Table 1. 
Related to the method, to assess how financial constraints affect the use of 
leasing by firms, we estimate the following model using logistic regressions: 
Li = α0 + β1FCi + β2CSCi + β3FSCi + εi    (1) 
Where i represents the ith observation; Li is a dummy variable that represents 
the use of leasing for each firm; FCi represents the group of variables that measure the 
existence of financial constraints; CSCi represents the set of variables that control for 
country-specific characteristics; FSCi represents the group of variables that measure 
the characteristics of each firm, and εi is the residual. 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
We create our leasing dummy dependent variable using the answers of the 
surveyed firm’s managers. When they state that leasing has been used as a source of 
financing, the variable leasing equals one and zero otherwise. 
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Next, in Table 4, we look at the use of leasing in terms of size and age of the 
firm. Panel A shows that 73.38% of medium-sized firms use leasing as a source of 
financing, while this percentage falls to 65.26% for small firms and 46.78% for micro 
firms. Therefore, there seems to be a positive association between firm size and the 
leasing as a source of financing. Regarding the use of leasing by groups created 
according to the age of the firm, panel B shows that the percentage of firms using 
leasing remains around 56% for all groups. 
Table 4 Overview of the Use of Leasing by Firm Size and Age 
Panel A. Use of leasing by firm size 
Number of employees Observations Leasing (%) 
0-9 2437 (55.07%) 46.78 
10-49 1278 (28.88%) 65.26 
50-249 710 (16.05%) 73.38 
Total 4425 (100%) 56.38 
Panel B. Use of leasing by firm age 
Age Observations Leasing (%) 
Less than 2 307 (6.96%) 55.37 
From 2 to 10 1208 (27.40%) 56.87 
More than 10 2894 (65.64%) 56.43 
Total 4409 (100%) 56.48 
3.3 Independent Variables 
Financial constraint variables. According to our hypothesis, the use of leasing 
should be more likely in firms which are more credit constrained. Therefore, this 
section explains the measures that we create, using the answers from the survey, in 
order to assess differences in the level of financial constraints across our firms. 
First, we create the dummy variable assure, which takes the value one when the 
manager of the firm states that difficult access to means of financing is the element 
that would hamper the development of the company, and zero otherwise. Second, we 
define the dummy variable allow, which takes the value one when the current financing 
situation of the company is not healthy enough to see its projects through, and zero 
otherwise. Third, we add the variable access, which ranges from one (very easy) to 
four (very difficult), to reflect the accessibility of a firm to reach a bank loan. Forth, 
we build the variable conclude to reflect the opinion of the firm as to whether its 
projects cannot be successfully concluded without a loan from the bank. This variable 
ranges from one (totally disagree) to four (totally agree). Finally, we include the 
variable internally that ranges from one (yes, absolutely) if the management of the firm 
can meet their financial needs internally to four (no, not at all) if they are not able to 
do so. Therefore, higher values in all these variables denote more financial constraints 
and, according to our first hypothesis, we should expect a positive sign. 
Country-specific variables. Next, we take into account the existence of cross-
country heterogeneity in the use of leasing by including several variables which define 
the institutional environment of the country where the firms operate. We control for 
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the economic, financial, and institutional environment of the country using the 
variables GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, stock traded, and credit info. 
To proxy for the economic environment, we create the variables GDP per 
capita, GDP growth and inflation. GDP per capita equals the natural logarithm of GDP 
in current prices in U.S. dollars divided by the population in 2003. GDP growth is a 
variable that represents the growth of the economy and it is computed as the increase 
in GDP in current prices in U.S. dollars between 2002 and 2003. Evidence provided 
by Beck et al. (2008) shows a positive association between the use of leasing and 
economic development. Countries with economies which present higher levels of 
development or higher rates of growth might offer more investment opportunities to 
their firms. These firms might be more in need of financing in order to take advantage 
of these possibilities and as a consequence, the use of leasing as a source of financing 
might help to fill these needs. Therefore, we expect greater use of leasing by firms 
located in developed and growing countries. 
We build the variable inflation, measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP 
implicit deflator which shows the rate of price changes in the economy as a whole in 
2003. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP 
in constant local currency. Beck et al. (2008) show that in general, firms operating in 
environments with a higher ratio of inflation rely less on external financing. However, 
when analysing each source of external financing in detail, their results point to greater 
use of leasing as inflation increases. Therefore, we could expect either a positive or a 
negative association between the use of leasing and the level of inflation. 
To proxy for the development of the financial system in a country, we create 
the variable stock traded. This variable is built using the value of stock traded as a 
percentage of GDP in 2003. Evidence provided by Beck et al. (2008) show a positive 
association between the use of leasing and higher levels of stock market development. 
They suggest that lessors might have better access to adequate funding for their loans 
in countries with a larger stock market. Therefore, we can expect that SMEs operating 
in countries with higher levels of stock traded are more likely to use leasing. 
Finally, to shed additional light on the use of leasing, we include the variable 
credit info to control for the institutional environment of a country. This variable 
measures the rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope and accessibility of 
credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit 
bureau in 2003. The credit info variable is computed as an index which ranges from 
zero to six, with higher values indicating higher development of the information 
structure of a country. Existing empirical evidence shows that greater information 
sharing mechanisms alleviate the moral hazard and adverse selection problems which 
are especially important for young firms and SMEs (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Love 
and Mylenko, 2003; Chavis et al., 2011). Therefore, we expect that the likelihood of 
using leasing by firms is higher in countries with sound credit information structures. 
Table 5 reports the scores for the use of leasing and country-specific variables 
by country. The use of leasing shows a considerable heterogeneity across the countries 
in our sample. Czech Republic, Germany and Slovak Republic show the highest use 
of leasing, whereas Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg show the lowest scores. At first 
sight, it is not possible to establish a pattern on how country variables influence the use 
of leasing. This imply that deeper analyses are necessary in order to evaluate what 
country-specific characteristics might play an important role in the decision to lease. 
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We can also appreciate the existence of important variations in the level of 
development across countries. For example, the highest GDP per capita (in 
Luxembourg 65,325) is more than thirteen times bigger than the smallest one (in Latvia 
4,775). The GDP per capita of the Slovak Republic is growing (0.36) more than two 
times faster than the economy of the United Kingdom (0.1587), and Slovenia scores 
the highest inflation rate (0.0565) whereas Lithuania shows a deflation rate (-0.0081). 
Regarding financial system development, Table 5 shows that the largest stock market 
as a percentage of the GDP corresponds to the Netherlands (0.9463), whereas the least 
developed stock market corresponds to Malta, which shows the lowest ratio (0.0099). 
Finally, we can observe that most of the EU 10 countries in our sample show the lowest 
scores in the variable credit info, indicating a modest development of their information 
structures.  
Table 5 Overview of the Use of Leasing and Country-Specific Variables 
Country Leasing (%) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP 
growth Inflation 
Stock 
traded 
Credit 
info 
Austria 68.21 31218 0.2235 0.0131 0.0474 5 
Belgium 37.50 30251 0.2329 0.0196 0.1335 6 
Cyprus 53.49 18256 0.2601 0.0517   
Czech Republic 75.73 9343 0.2151 0.0109  5 
Denmark 52.24 39488 0.2228 0.0148 0.2040 3 
Estonia 68.93 7282 0.3442 0.0429 0.0574 5 
Finland 43.04 31522 0.2150 0.0021 0.8416 4 
France 56.42 28917 0.2342 0.0187 0.5991 3 
Germany 76.21 29384 0.2078 0.0121 0.4193 6 
Greece 36.73 17356 0.3203 0.0345 0.1682 4 
Hungary 49.32 8243 0.2584 0.0546 0.1046 3 
Ireland 59.60 39631 0.2904 0.0327 0.0375 5 
Italy 53.54 26172 0.2360 0.0318 0.5456 6 
Latvia 46.96 4775 0.2083 0.0490 0.0124 4 
Lithuania 41.84 5424 0.3133 -0.0081 0.0105 3 
Luxembourg 26.80 65325 0.2913 0.0304 0.0101  
Malta 63.73 12648 0.1917 0.0353 0.0099  
The Netherlands 50.26 33356 0.2295 0.0217 0.9463 5 
Poland 56.70 5676 0.0940 0.0077 0.0361 5 
Portugal 47.96 15472 0.2240 0.0344 0.1454 5 
Slovak Republic 80.37 6151 0.3600 0.0535 0.0142 3 
Slovenia 51.72 14617 0.2600 0.0565 0.0168 3 
Spain 59.86 21023 0.2877 0.0392 0.6876 6 
Sweden 65.65 35221 0.2540 0.0176  4 
United Kingdom 48.98 31134 0.1587 0.0273 0.6593 6 
Notes: Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1 
Firm-specific variables. Next in this section, we describe those variables aimed 
at controlling for firm heterogeneity. 
Following the EU recommendation 2003/361, we create three dummy variables 
to classify firms in our sample into micro, small and medium sized if their number of 
employees is less than 10, between 10 and 49, and between 50 and 249 respectively. 
Empirical results in the existing literature do not show clear evidence about the use of 
leasing across firms of different sizes. On the one hand, Chavis et al. (2011) show that 
micro and small firms are less likely to use leasing than medium-sized and large firms, 
and Beattie et al. (2000) show that medium-sized firms are the most common users of 
leasing because they need more financing in order to grow3. On the other hand, several 
 
3 Beattie et al. (2000) analyse a sample of 300 listed companies. 
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studies show the contrary association. Results provided by Cosci et al. (2013) and 
Neuberger and Räthke-Döppner (2013) show that small firms are, compared to larger 
companies, more likely to experience credit rationing and use leasing. Sharpe and 
Nguyen (1995) and Lasfer and Levis (1998) find that small firms use more leasing than 
large firms.4 Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) argue that leasing is the first external financing 
option according to the Pecking Order Theory when informational asymmetries are 
important, which existing literature suggests is usually the case of most SMEs. 
Therefore, we could expect that the use of leasing either increases or decreases with 
the size of the firm. 
We use the categorical variable age, which ranges from one to six, to allow for 
differences in the use of leasing among firms that have been in operation less than two 
years and more than 30 years, respectively. According to Cosci et al. (2013) and 
Neuberger and Räthke-Döppner (2013), we could expect that younger firms are more 
in need of obtaining financing and therefore, more likely to use leasing. 
Existing literature suggests that firms operating in sectors that require an 
investment in specialized assets make a lower use of lease financing than firms with 
assets which are more easily redeployable by the lessor (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; 
Lasfer and Levis, 1998; Beattie et al., 2000). We control for these industry differences 
creating seven industry dummies which, for sake of conciseness, will not be displayed 
and discussed in the results section.5 
To proxy for differences in firm growth, we include a dummy variable, growth, 
that equals one if the firm has increased the number of employees since the last year 
and zero otherwise. Cosci et al. (2013) find that Italian SMEs with a higher growth rate 
use more leasing, because they do not have a solid position in the market and they are 
perceived as riskier. Barclay and Smith (1995) and Lin et al. (2013) find that overall 
use fixed-claim obligations, both borrowing and lease financing, decreases in response 
to the existence of growth opportunities in order to mitigate conflicts of interest 
between debtholders and stockholder. However, while firms with more growth options 
use less debt, they also show that a higher fraction of fixed-claim obligations is 
allocated to leasing and less to borrowing. This argument is at the core of the positive 
association between growth opportunities and the likelihood of using leasing reported 
by Krishnan and Moyer (1994) in Belgian, and Deloof et al. (2007) in the US. 
Therefore, we could expect a positive sign on the coefficient for the variable growth. 
We define the dummy variable foreign, which equals one if the ownership of 
the company exclusively belongs to international investors, and zero otherwise. 
According to Beck et al. (2006), firms with foreign ownership should have fewer 
problems accessing lease financing. In contrast, Beck et al. (2008) show that the share 
of assets funded with lease capital decreases for foreign-owned firms and Chavis et al. 
(2011) find a negative association in the use of leasing in firms with foreign ownership. 
Therefore, the variable foreign could appear with both signs in our regressions. 
In addition, we build a dummy variable, subsidies, that equals one for those 
SMEs that have already made use of public subsidies for its activities, and zero 
 
4 Lasfer and Levis (1998) use a sample of quoted and unquoted companies. 
5 The seven industry classifications made in the survey are: extraction or production of raw materials, 
construction or civil engineering, production and manufacturing of goods, trade and distribution, transport, 
business services and, other services to consumers. 
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otherwise. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) provide the only piece of related 
evidence and show that the share of companies using external financing does not 
increase after receiving government subsidies. As a consequence, there is not a clear 
sign that could be expected for the variable subsidies in our regressions. 
We understand that there could be alternative ways of measuring our firm-
specific variables, or even that could have included more firm-specific characteristics. 
Unfortunately, we are limited by the data provided by the survey, and we cannot define 
another variable for any other firm characteristic or add additional firm-specific 
factors. 
4. Results 
In Table 6, first column, we analyse the effect of firm-specific characteristics 
and country-specific characteristics on the use of leasing, while controlling for country 
and industry effects.6 The negative coefficients on the variables micro and small show 
that the smallest firms in our sample have a lower likelihood of using leasing than 
medium-sized firms. This confirms previous results provided by Beattie et al. (2000) 
and Chavis et al. (2011). According to Beattie et al. (2000), medium-sized firms use 
leasing more commonly because they are growing and therefore, they are more in need 
of financing. We also find a negative coefficient on the variable age. This indicates 
that the likelihood of using leasing is lower for older firms which confirms the results 
provided by Cosci et al. (2013). This might be because firms with an extended credit 
history prefer to rely more on alternative sources of financing (Chavis et al., 2011). 
Consistent with previous evidence (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Lasfer and 
Levis, 1998; Deloof et al., 2007; Cosci et al., 2013) and our prediction, the results 
indicate that firms with positive growth have a higher likelihood of using leasing.7 We 
also report a positive and statistically significant association between the foreign 
ownership of firms and the likelihood of using leasing, supporting previous evidence 
in Beck et al. (2008) and Chavis et al. (2011). We also find that firms receiving 
subsidies are more likely to use leasing, as indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) coefficient for the variable subsidies. Finally, we observe 
that the country fixed effects are statistically significant, confirming the role that 
institutional differences play in the deployment and use of lease financing in European 
SMEs. 
Regarding country-specific variables, we find positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for the variables GDP per capita, GDP growth and stock 
traded. As we predict, and in line with previous evidence (Beck et al., 2008), firms in 
wealthy, faster-growing economies and with a developed stock market have more 
probabilities to fill their financial needs with leasing.8 The results also show a positive 
 
6 Country and industry effects are included in all regressions, but not reported to save space and for ease of 
exposition. These variables are available upon request. 
7 As a robustness check, we use the firm’s turnover to measure the growth with a dummy variable that takes 
the value one when the firm’s turnover has increased since last year and zero otherwise. The coefficient for 
this variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% level in all regressions. The remaining results 
remain qualitatively the same confirming our conclusions. 
8 As a robustness check, we include the variable private credit, measured as the ratio of bank credit to the 
private sector as percentage of GDP, as an additional measure to control for financial sector development. 
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and statistically significant coefficient (at 1% level) for the variable credit info, 
showing that firms in countries with higher levels of information infrastructures are 
more likely to use leasing than firms in countries with weaker systems.  
In addition, Table 6 includes five regressions adding each one of the financial 
restrictions variables, while controlling for firm and country-specific characteristics. 
These models allow us to assess whether financially constrained SMEs are more likely 
to use leasing. We remember that higher values for the variables assure, allow, access, 
conclude, and internally indicate the existence of higher levels of financial constraints 
in the firm. We show how all the financial constraint variables display a positive, and 
statistically significant, association with the variable leasing. This indicates that those 
SMEs having more problems to fund their activity are more likely to use leasing. 
Regarding the effect of firm and country-specific characteristics on the use of leasing, 
results remain qualitatively the same after controlling for the existence of financial 
constraints in the firm.In order to shed additional light on how financial restrictions 
affect the use of leasing, we analyse the economic impact of our results in Table 7. We 
do so by comparing the effect on the dependent variable of changes in the financial 
constraint variables when each one goes from its lowest value (column “Low financial 
obstacles”) to its highest value (column “High financial obstacles”). This comparation 
(included in column “Economic impact”) shows changes in the likelihood of using 
lease financing following changes from zero to one in the variables assure and allow, 
and changes from one to four in the variables access, internally and conclude. 
Therefore, the economic impact reflects the difference in the likelihood of using 
leasing between highly constrained firms and those with a healthier financial situation. 
Inspection of Table 7 reveals that, for example, the variable internally causes the 
highest increase in the likelihood of using leasing. The probability of using leasing is 
51.68% for firms whose financial needs can be met internally, whereas this likelihood 
rises to 68.27% for those firms with a less healthy financial situation. However, 
looking at the variable allow, we observe that the likelihood of using leasing only 
increases by 4.32% for firms with a financing situation which is not sufficient to see 
its projects through, compared to those firms with a less restricted financial situation. 
These results suggest that having five different measures is important in order to obtain 
a better picture of the association between the existence of financial obstacles and the 
use of leasing. This large variation in economic impact could explain the lack of 
statistically significant results in previous studies. 
 
 
We have to notice that the inclusion of the variable private credit in our regressions forces us to drop the 
variable GDP per capita because both variables are highly correlated (0.77). The new results (available upon 
request) show a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the variable private credit. This indicates 
that firms in countries with a larger banking system are more likely to use leasing. However, we also observe 
that our main results remain qualitatively the same in these new regressions. Therefore, we choose to keep 
our original results, because we strongly believe that it is more appropriate to control for the level of 
country’s economic development while at the same time controlling for supply characteristics with the 
variable stock trade, than omitting the variable GDP per capita in order to include the variable private credit. 
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Table 7 Economic Impact of Financial Constraint Variables 
Variables Leasing (%) Low financial obstacles 
Leasing (%) 
High financial obstacles 
Economic impact 
(%) 
Assure 54.62 66.54 11.92 
Allow 55.13 59.45 4.32 
Access 54.27 60.33 6.06 
Conclude 50.27 62.10 11.83 
Internally 51.68 68.27 16.59 
Notes: Definitions and sources of the variables are reported in Table 1 
4.1 Additional Analyses 
We recognize that we do not have ideal measures to analyse firms’ financial 
restrictions because of data limitations. However, in order to make a richer analysis, in 
this subsection, we include one more variable to measure firm’s financial restrictions 
using the best approximation to an objective measure that the survey can offer. This 
new variable, named debt worsening, is a dummy variable that takes the value one if 
the firm has stated that its level of debt has deteriorated since last year and zero 
otherwise. In Table 8, column 1, we find that the coefficient on the variable debt 
worsening is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming previous 
results and the hypothesis of our study. The remaining results remain qualitatively the 
same. Therefore, our results strongly support that leasing can act as alternative funding 
to complement the financing needs of SMEs whose access to traditional sources of 
financing is restricted. 
We extend our analyses including two additional models to assess whether the 
effect of financial constraints on the use of leasing varies with firm size or with the 
level of economic development where the firm operates. Previous literature has shown 
that smaller firms are more opaque and have financial behaviour and constraints which 
are different from larger firms (Berger and Udell, 2006), while countries with higher 
levels of economic development are more financially developed and they usually have 
better institutions, which translate in reduced risk and increased access to financing for 
SMEs (Levine et al., 2000; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Therefore, we have carried 
out additional analyses to assess the effect of financial constraints on the use of leasing 
for micro firms and for firms operating in developed countries. 9  
Firstly, we have introduced interaction terms of our financial restriction 
variables with the dummy variable micro and run all regressions in Table 6 again. 
Table 8, column 2, shows a positive coefficient on the variable internally, whereas its 
interaction term shows a negative coefficient (both results are statistically significant), 
while our main results remain qualitatively the same. This means that micro firms are 
less likely than small and medium-sized firms to use leasing when their financing 
needs are not met internally. Therefore, the smaller firms are, the less likely they are 
to complement internal financing with leasing. Lack of internally generated resources 
can reduce the willingness and feasibility with which lease financing can be offered to 
micro firms. 
Secondly, we have introduced interaction terms of our financial restriction 
variables with a dummy variable, named GDPcap_dummy, that takes the value one if 
 
9 For sake of conciseness and simplicity, Table 8 only includes those new results which are statistically 
significant. The remaining results are available upon request. 
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the firm operates in a country with a GDP per capita above the sample mean and zero 
otherwise. Table 8, column 3, shows a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
on the interaction term assure*GDPcap_dummy. Therefore, SMEs stating that difficult 
access to means of financing would hamper the development of the company are more 
likely to resort to leasing when they operate in richer than in poorer countries. This 
probably suggests that SMEs operating in more developed economies find easier to 
access lease financing to develop their business when the access to financing is rather 
difficult. 
Table 8 Logistic Regressions of the Use of Leasing on Financial Constraint and Firm 
and Country-Specific Variables 
 Logit (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) 
Constant -26.3298*** (7.0601) 
-33.7291*** 
(6.7144) 
-51.6475*** 
(11.5064) 
Financial constraints variables: 
Assure    0.2618* (0.1539) 
Assure*GDPcap_dummy   0.5680*** (0.2147) 
Internally  0.3714*** (0.0782)  
Internally*Micro  -0.1787* (0.0967)  
Debt worsening 0.3750*** (0.1059)   
Country-specific variables: 
GDP per capita 1.3595*** (0.4490) 
1.7686*** 
(0.4252)  
GDPcap_dummy   44.4891*** (10.8287) 
GDP growth 23.2173*** (5.4524) 
28.2899*** 
(5.1736) 
14.1388*** 
(3.3639) 
Inflation 4.5047 (4.1860) 
3.7233 
(3.9793) 
11.2895*** 
(3.8713) 
Credit info 2.5968*** (0.6039) 
3.1079*** 
(0.5741) 
0.7958** 
(0.3585) 
Stock traded 6.0232* (3.3992) 
10.3608*** 
(3.2289) 
68.7129*** 
(17.2592) 
Firm-specific variables: 
Micro -1.0856*** (0.1199) 
-0.8065*** 
(0.1979) 
-1.0786*** 
(0.1193) 
Small -0.2917** (0.1240) 
-0.3199*** 
(0.1208) 
-0.2927** 
(0.1233) 
Age -0.0715** (0.0311) 
-0.0637** 
(0.0302) 
-0.0581* 
(0.0312) 
Growth 0.2752*** (0.0934) 
0.3410*** 
(0.0906) 
0.3431*** 
(0.0921) 
Foreign 0.6675*** (0.2282) 
0.5583*** 
(0.2142) 
0.4466** 
(0.2181) 
Subsides 0.3482*** (0.1019) 
0.3489*** 
(0.1000) 
0.2907*** 
(0.1020) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Country effects  Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Observations 3342 3539 3348 
Pseudo-R-square 0.0854 0.0891 0.0875 
Notes: The dependent variable is leasing. All specifications include industry and country fixed effects. Definitions 
and sources of the variables are reported in Table 1. ***, **, * denote significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively and the standard errors are in brackets. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Luxembourg, 
Malta and Sweden are excluded from the regressions because of missing values of the variables credit 
info and stock trade. 
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5. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether the use of leasing increases for 
constrained SMEs while controlling for firm, bank and country-specific characteristics 
using a sample of 4,583 firms operating in 25 European countries. Traditional wisdom 
states that SMEs are financially constrained because they are perceived as riskier than 
large companies due to their opaqueness and the lower quality of their financial 
statements, the lack of an extended credit history or the absence of collateral. However, 
leasing might be an alternative for constrained SMEs because it does not have 
additional collateral requirements. Moreover, leasing reduces the risk for the lender 
because facilitates the repossession of the asset and places the leased asset, rather than 
the quality of the borrower, as a primary source of repayment. 
The evidence we provide in this paper, confirming our hypothesis, indicates 
that constrained SMEs use leasing as an alternative source of financing. The likelihood 
of using leasing increases when the development of the company is being hampered 
by a lack of capital financing, when the financing situation prevents the company from 
carrying out their projects, when the access to bank loans is difficult, when the projects 
cannot be successfully concluded without a loan from the bank, or when the financing 
needs of the firm are not met internally. Due to the international dimension of this 
paper, our results also show that country-specific characteristics are important in 
explaining differences in the use of lease financing in SMEs. The evidence shows that, 
on the whole, SMEs operating in countries with sound and growing economics and 
with developed stock markets and information structures are more likely to use leasing.  
The above results are important in light of the accounting changes introduced 
by the IFRS 16 Leases (IFRS 16) that becomes effective beginning on or after January 
2019. In a qualitative survey-based study, the European Financial Reporting Advisory 
Group (EFRAG, 2017) finds two main potential negative effects of IRFS 16 on SMEs. 
Firstly, 19 out of 22 respondents recognize that SMEs experience greater challenges 
than larger entities in implementing any significant accounting change. Secondly, three 
respondents think that the application of the IFRS 16 would be disproportionately 
complex and costly for limited benefits and may result in some European SMEs being 
at a competitive disadvantage. 
Our study makes several important contributions to academics, managers, and 
policy makers. First, this paper contributes to the existing financial literature by 
conducting an empirical study on the relation between the use of leasing and the 
existence of financial constraints for European SMEs. Second, our paper can help firm 
managers to better understand the advantages of lease financing that make it a good 
alternative source financing, and it shows mangers how the existence of financial 
constraints triggers the use of leasing in SMEs. From a policy perspective, policy 
makers might recognize the significant role that leasing plays in the financing of 
constrained SMEs, specially, taking into account the proposals included in the 
finalization of Basel III regulations. As Leaseurope recognizes, Basel III overestimates 
the real risks of leasing exposures which implies that leasing is penalized by the current 
regulatory framework increasing the capital requirements for this form of financing. 
This could disincentive banks from offering leasing which would damage even more 
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the financing of SMEs. 10 An appropriate regulation on leasing would most likely result 
in financially healthier SMEs that could pursue their growing ambitions and positively 
contribute to job and GDP creation. 
  
 
10 Information available at: https://nvl-lease.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Leaseurope-Leaflet-Prudential-
Treament-of-Leasing-Proposal.pdf 
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